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A speedy resolution of the long-standing dispute between 
China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu 
Islands (Senkaku in Japanese) does not seem likely. But 
most Chinese experts agree that this diplomatic row has 
reached a critical stage. The writers say that China has 
not had to face such a serious “Japanese threat” (日本威
胁，riben weixie) since the end of World War II. Zhu Feng 
says that military conflict between China and Japan over 
the Diaoyu Islands is inevitable, but that things have not 
yet come to that. Zhu says it is “extreme” (偏激, pianji) 
and “not common sense” (缺乏常识的看法, quefa changshi 
de kanfa) to think that protecting Chinese sovereignty can 
legitimise the use of military force at every opportunity. 
Shi Yinhong,  quoted in Caijing’s editorial of 9 September, 
agrees15. He says the situation is serious, but he does not 
believe that the relationship between China and Japan can 
be completely compromised right now. The experts rule out 
a military solution. Instead, they consider which strategy 
China should adopt so as to resolve the dispute without 
endangering the country’s economic and strategic interests.
Crisis diplomacy, patriotism, and power
Zhu Feng proposes a “three-pronged strategy to protect 
the islands”, centred on three principles: complete military 
preparedness (充分的军事准备，chongfen de junshi 
zhunbei); effective crisis diplomacy (成功的危机外交， 
chenggong de weiji waijiao); and combining the efforts of 
the Chinese government and society (中国政府与社会共同
努力， Zhongguo zhengfu yu shehui gongtong nuli).
He spends most time developing the second point, saying 
that “effective crisis diplomacy” does not just mean the 
ability of a government or a country to manage a diplomatic 
controversy. The country needs to announce that it has 
good intentions and is willing to cooperate, and by doing 
so, obtain international support in the dispute. To achieve 
13   Zhu Feng is a professor at the School of International Studies, Peking 
University.
14  Wu Di is a member of the Research Centre on Transnational 
Corporations in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.
15   Shi Yinhong is professor of International Relations and director of the 
Centre on American Studies at the People’s University of China, Beijing.
this, the government must focus on contact, dialogue, 
and communication, while remaining unshakeable 
on protecting the country’s interests and sovereignty. 
International alliances must also be considered, and the 
government should give some thought to logical potential 
strategic allies. For example, China’s territorial disputes 
with Japan also concern Russia and South Korea16. China 
could capitalise on a shared opposition to the Japanese right 
wing, which, Zhu says, is “a common enemy of the political 
community of East Asia” (东亚政治共同的敌人, dongya 
zhengzhi gongtong de diren). China, he says, should join 
South Korea in opposing Japan. In an international crisis 
like the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, “effective crisis 
diplomacy” must be implemented as soon as possible to 
reassert China’s position.
Zhu says that media patriotism and public opinion must 
be respected. But it should not be allowed to descend into 
“puerile patriotism” (爱国主义幼稚病, aiguo zhuyi youzhi 
bing) or a “patriotic frenzy” (爱国主义狂躁症，aiguo zhuyi 
kuangzao bing). He says China should “complain less and 
act more” (少放炮、多做事, shao fangpao, duo zuo shi). It 
will need to do this in the conflicts it will face in the future, 
which will be increasingly frequent and hard to manage.
Wang Yizhou thinks China’s problem is that it “still has a 
deep-rooted war mentality, but lacks a commitment to 
producing international public goods”17. He says that any 
solution must be in line with the Chinese government’s 
diplomatic agenda, and should be based on a mixture of 
soft and hard power. Beijing should definitely not give up 
on hard power. If China wants to become a major maritime 
power, it must use whatever means it can to protect its 
maritime space: warships, fishing boats, the coast guard, 
and so on. But China must also plan and articulate a clear 
soft power strategy. It needs to learn and apply the rules for 
managing international waters, including those that relate 
to fishing, protecting marine biodiversity, or exploiting 
natural resources. Wang says that “China must become 
the guardian of security in international waters” (中国要做
国际海洋安全的保护者, zhongguo yao zuo guoji haiyang 
anquan de baohuzhe). By its actions, it should present itself 
as a protector, and using its ideological positions, it should 
take on a leadership role. 
Using economic leverage against Japan 
Zhao Quansheng and Wu Di propose an economic solution 
to the standoff18. Zhao says China should use its economic 
dominance to put pressure on Japan and to reward regional 
16   Aside from the standoff over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Japan is 
also dealing with other disputes, in particular with South Korea over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, and with Russia over four islands in the Kouri-
les archipelago. 
17  Quoted in the Caijing editorial of 9 September 2012. Wang Yizhou 
is vice-dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University.
18   Quoted in the Caijing editorial of 9 September 2012. Zhao Quansheng 
is director of the Centre for Asian Studies at the School of International 
Service, American University.
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becoming just another ailing economy of East Asia, like 
its neighbour. But Wu is concerned about the prospects 
for success: he says that “China’s greatest strategic enemy, 
in the past, present, and future, is itself.” (中国最大的战略
敌人过去是、现在是、将来也是中国自己, Zhongguo zui 
da de zhanlüe diren guoqu shi, xianzai shi, jianglai ye shi 
Zhongguo ziji).
Translation: WordWorks, Peter Brown 
Editing: Justine Doody
security. Wu says that there is no point in getting ready 
ships and artillery – he thinks China’s most useful weapon 
against Japan is time. Japan’s economy is suffering from a 
“terminal illness of the economy” (经济绝症, jingji juezheng). 
This will eventually weaken the country so much that it will 
not be able to make any demands on the international stage. 
Wu says that Japan’s economic situation is not viable in the 
long term. In 2011, debt-to-GDP ratio was greater than 200 
percent, while GDP was at the same level as it was in 2007. 
The country’s fiscal deficit is largely underpinned by the 
savings of national companies, which have become less and 
less internationally competitive. Soon, they will no longer 
be able to underwrite Japan’s growing debt. When the 
country’s debt reaches the level of Greece, it will most likely 
have to call on China for financial help. Wu expects this to 
happen around 2016. He quotes a macroeconomic report 
saying that by then, Japan will have completely exhausted 
its national savings, so its national debt will represent 
100 percent of domestic savings19. At the same time, China’s 
GDP will have 
overtaken that 
of the US. When 
that happens, 
Tokyo will be 
forced to ask for 
Beijing’s financial 
assistance. China 
will be able to 
use its strong 
economic position to impose conditions, including a 
settlement on the Diaoyu Islands. Wu points out that the 
European economic crisis has shown that for a country on 
the verge of bankruptcy, “sovereignty is a luxury” (主权是奢
侈品, zhuquan shi shechipin).
That said, the Diaoyu Islands will only be returned to China 
if a clear strategy is defined and implemented, gradually 
and deliberately, starting from now. Deng Xiaoping’s 
approach of “hiding your talents and biding your time” is 
a “game that only China has the luxury to play” (一个奢
侈的游戏只有中国玩得起, yi ge shechi de youxi zhi you 
Zhongguo wandeqi). China must therefore first ensure a 
soft landing for its economy in the coming years – which 
will not be easy. Wu recommends a structural readjustment 
of the Chinese economy to address the challenge posed by 
its ageing population, a phenomenon that he describes as 
“a time bomb” (定时炸弹，dingshi zhadan). He proposes a 
shift from a model based on cheap labour to a knowledge-
based, high-tech, high value-added model. He says that 
for economic growth to continue, China will have to 
encourage domestic consumption rather than depending 
on investment.
Wu says these economic issues are much more important 
than the issue of the Diaoyu Islands or war with Japan. 
China will have to take steps to address them, or risk 
19   The writer is referring here to economic research conducted by British 
observers and based on variable perceptions: in 2016, Japan’s debt is 
expected to reach 100 percent of domestic savings.
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